INTRODUCTION
It seems to be customary in Europe to distinguish a French and an American school in the field of multi-criteria décision analysis (Schârlig, 1985; Colson and De Bruyn, 1989) . The founding father of the French school is B. Roy who developed a series of ELECTRE methods (see Roy, 1968 Roy, , 1985 Roy, , 1989 and prompted many scientists, mainly in French-speaking régions, to design related methods such as PROMÉTHÉE (Brans, Maréchal and Vincke, 1984) . The American school is inspired by the work of Keeney and Raiffa (1976) on multi-attibute value functions and multi-attribute utility theory. A popular method, typically fitting into this framework, is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) of Saaty (1980, 1988) . Both schools are concerned with the same problem: the évaluation of a finite number of alternatives A u . . ., A n under a finite number of conflicting criteria C l5 . . ., C ms by a single décision maker or by a decision-making body. Taking ELECTRE and the AHP to represent (as usually) the respective schools, we can easily describe the différences and the similarities.
ELECTRE starts with a pairwise évaluation of the alternatives under each of the criteria separately. Using the physical or monetary values g t {A^) and gi (Au °f tne respective alternatives Aj and A k under a measurable criterion C i9 and introducing certain threshold levels for the différence g i (A j ) -g i (A k ) , the décision maker may déclare that he is indifferent between the alternatives under considération, that he has a weak or a strict préférence for one of the two, or that he is unable to express any of these préférence relations. If the alternatives are not measurable under C i5 their performance is expressed on a qualitative scale with increasing values such as 1, 2, ..., 10 assigned to the respective echelons; thereafter, threshold levels are introduced and employed in the same way to elicit the required préférence information. Both, indiffér-ence between Aj and A k , as well as a weak or a strict préférence for A p are summarized in the statement that Aj is at least as good as A k or, equivalently, that Aj outranks A k . Thus, under each criterion there is a complete or incomplete System of binary relations between the alternatives, the so-called outranking relations. Next, the décision maker is requested to assign weights or importance factors to the criteria in order to express their relative importance; ELECTRE does not really propose a systematic approach to reduce the notorious inconsistency of human beings when they establish such weights. Finally, there is an aggregation step. For each pair of alternatives Aj and A k ELECTRE calculâtes the so-called concordance index, roughly defined as the total amount of évidence to support the conclusion that Aj globally outranks A k9 as well as the discordance index, the total amount of FRENCH AND AMERICAN SCHOOL MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS 265 counter-evidence. The concordance index includes, for instance, the total weight of the criteria where Aj outranks A k \ in the discordance index, the veto thresholds play a major role. Balancing the two indexes, ELECTRE finally décides whether Aj outranks A k , whether A k outranks Aj or whether there is no global outranking relationship between the two alternatives. Eventually, ÉLECTRE yields a global system of binary outranking relations between the alternatives. Because the system is not necessarily complete, ÉLECTRE is sometimes unable to identify the preferred alternative. It only produces then a core of leading alternatives. Moreover, ÉLECTRE cannot always rank the alternatives completely in a subjective order of préférence.
The AHP also starts with a pairwise évaluation of the alternatives under each of the criteria separately. In the basic experiment, where the alternatives Aj and A k are presented under the criterion Q, the décision maker is requested to express his indifférence between the two, or his weak, strong, or very strong préférence for one of them. His verbal judgement (the selected gradation) is subsequently converted into a numerical value r$ on the so-called fundamental scale. Using the matrix R l = {r$}, the AHP calculâtes the partial, singlecriterion scores v^Aj), 7=1, . . ., n, also referred to as the impact scores, approximating the subjective values of the alternatives under criterion C t . It is worth noting that the partial scores are not unique. Because the ratio v i (Aj)/v i (A k ) is defined for each pair (A j9 A k ) of alternatives, the partial scores have a multiplicative degree of freedom. They can accordingly be normalized in such a way that (1) Similar pairwise comparisons and similar calculations yield normalized weights w(Q), z=l, . . ., m, for the respective criteria. Finally, there is an aggregation step generating the global, multi-criteria scores J(A^) via the arithmetic-mean rule
t = l
By these quantities, usually referred to as the final scores, we have a global order (a global préférence structure) defined on the set of alternatives. In the terminology of the American school, the partial and the final scores constitute partial value functions and a global value function respectively. In gênerai, 266 F. A. LOOTSMA each of the alternatives is Pareto-optimal, because alternatives dominated by others can immediately be dropped from further considération.
At first sight, the AHP yields stronger results than ELECTRE, The final scores can be used to identify the preferred alternative, to sort the alternatives into a limited number of catégories, to rank the alternatives in a subjective order of préférence, and to allocate resources to the respective alternatives on the basis of the relative préférences for them. Sensitivity analysis, however, shows that the rank order of the final scores varies under reasonable dévi-ations from the fondamental scale, so that sorting procedures and resource allocation must be carried out with great care (Lootsma et al, 1990) . Moreover, décision makers find it difficult to choose one of the verbal qualifications (indifférence, weak, strong, or very strong préférence) in order to express their relative préférence for one of the two alternatives in a pairwise compari» son. This is particularly true in those cases where the performance of the alternatives Aj and A k under a given criterion C ( can be expressed in physical or monetary values g t (Aj) and g t (A k ) . When the décision makers carry out the required experiments, they are puzzled by the relation between the physical or monetary values on the one hand and the impact scores Vi(Aj) and v^Aô n the other. In ÉLECTRE, the treatment of measurable criteria is defmitely more direct and more transparent, It seems to be easier for a décision maker to accept the AHP when the performance of the alternatives cannot be measured (when the colours of the alternatives are eompared* for instance 5 or the design, the élégance, and the style), and when the criteria are compared on the basis of their relative importance in the actual décision problem (Barda, 1989) . Here, ÉLECTRE's facilities are weaker, so that the AHP could be used to fill the gap in actual applications of ÉLECTRE.
This question leads us straightaway to the heart of the matter in the present paper. The physical or monetary values g^ (Aj) and g ( (A k ) are usually obtained by a more or less objective évaluation of the alternatives, that is, by scientific measurement or by cost calculations. The impact scores v^Aj) and Vi(A k ) are due to a subjective weighing of the alternatives, via human judgement expressed in verbal terms, We cannot deny that the transition from objective évaluation to subjective weighing, as well as the quantification of verbal judgement, are still poorly explamed. Saaty (1980, 1988) introduced on doubtful grounds a "fundamental scale" and an '*eigenvector method" to calculate the impact scores and the criterion weights; his arithmetic-mean aggregatkm rule (2) does not really apply, because only the ratios v^A^lv^Aâ re properly defmed [for a critical discussion, see also French (1988) ]. In recent years, we introduced a class of geometrie scales and a geometric-mean aggregation rule (Lootsma, 1987 (Lootsma, , 1988 Lootsma et al, 1990) , but in real-life applications we are still not satisfied with the underlying theory: we cannot properly explain it to the décision makers. This prompted us to carry out additional research on the nature of comparative human judgement. The results may be found in the sections to foliow.
The organization of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a heuristic introduction to illustrate the transition from car priées to the subjective judgements whereby cars are referred to as "cheap", "somewhat more expensive", "more expensive", or "much more expensive". In fact, we subdivide a given price range into a number of price catégories (intervals) which are feit to be of the same order of magnitude, and we use the corresponding echelons (levels) to establish ratios of price incréments expressing what we mean by "somewhat more", "more", and "much more". Section 3 shows that human judgement leads in many unrelated areas to the same categorization of intervals: there are roughly four major catégories, the echelons constitute a séquence with geometrie progression, and the progression factor is roughly 4. We use these results in Section 4 to propose a natural geometrie scale for the quantification of verbal, comparative judgement: a scale with major as well as threshold echelons, and the progression factor 2. Moreover, we calculate the impact scores and the criterion weights via logarithmic régression, whereby we cover applications in groups of décision makers with non-negligible power relations. In Section 5, we are concerned with the geometric-mean aggregation rule and with the notorious phenomenon of rank reversai. We show that the weights of the criteria as well as the final scores of the alternatives are rather insensitive to variations of the scale parameter, the logarithm of the progression factor which characterizes the geometrie scales. Nevertheless, rank reversai is an almost inévitable phenomenon in our revised version of the AHP (rank reversai due to scale sensitivity is ignored in Saaty's original version). Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with some gênerai remarks and comments on the subjective weighing via multi-criteria methods of the French and the American school. We shall particularly discuss the question of whether the proposed décision support is welcome in actual décision making. It is our expérience that advisory councils and consulting companies may reject the support, so that the décision is ultimately left to authorities who do not always have the time to digest the flood of information presented to them.
CATEGORIZATION OF A PRICE RANGE
We start with the example which is frequently used to illustrate multicriteria analysis: the évaluation and the sélection of a car. Usually, low costs are important for the décision maker so that he carefully considers the consumer price, and possibly the annual expenditures for maintenance and insurance,
The consumer priée as such, however, cannot tell us whether the car in question would be more or less acceptable to him. That dépends on his spending power and on the alternative cars which he seriously has in mind. In gênerai, there is a minimum price C mm which he is prepared to pay, and a maximum price C max which he can afford and which he does not really want to exceed, Intuitively, he will subdivide the price range (C mift , C max ) into a number of price catégories by the introduction of subjectively distinct price levels partitioning the range into subintervals which are felt to be of the same order of magnitude. We take e 0) e u e 2 , . • • to stand for the so~called echelons of the category scale under construction, and C min + e ö , C mln + e l9 ... as the associated price levels. In order to model the requirement that the subintervals must subjectively be equal, we recall Weber's law (1834) in psychophysics, stating that the just noticeable différence As of stimulus intensities must be proportional to the actual stimulus level s. The just noticeable différence is a step of the smallest possible order of magnitude when we move from C mîn to C max ; we assume that it is practically the step carried out in the construction of our model. Thus, taking hère the price incrément above C min as the stimulus ïntensity, that is, assuming that the décision maker is not really sensitive to the price as such but to the excess above the minimum price C min which he has to pay anyway, we set -Vj^e^i, 5=1, 2, .. ., which yields
Obviously, the echelons constitute a séquence with geometrie progression. The initial step is e 0 , and (1 +e) is the progression factor. It is important to observe that the number of catégories is rather small, because our linguistic capacity to describe the catégories unambiguously in verbal terms is limited. We can introducé, for instance, the following qualifications to identify the subséquent price catégories:
cheap, cheap/somewhat more expensive* somewhat more expensive, somewhat more/more expensive, more expensive, more/imich more expensive, much more expensive. Thus, we have four major, linguistically distinct catégories: cheap, somewhat more, and much more expensive cars. Moreover, there are three so-called threshold catégories between them, which can be used if the décision maker hésitâtes between the neighbouring qualifications.
The next section will show that human beings follow the same pattern in many unrelated areas when they categorize an interval. They introducé three to five major catégories, and the progression factor (1 + e) 2 is roughly 4. By the interpolation of threshold catégories, they have a more refïned subdivision of the given interval. Then there are six to nine catégories, and the progression factor (1 +e) is roughly 2. In the present section, we will use these results in advance, in order to complete the categorization of a price range. Let us, for instance, take the range between Dfl 20,000 (écu 9,000) for a modest Renault 5 and Dfl 40,000 (écu 18,000) for a well-equipped Renault 21 in the Netherlands. The length of the range is Dfl 20,000. Hence, setting the last price level C min + e 6 roughly at C max we have (l+e) 6 e 0 = 20,000; 1+8 = 2, e o -20,000/64^300.
It is sometimes more convenient to associate the above-named qualifications, not with the sub-intervals, but with the price levels. Thus, cheap cars are roughly found at the price C min + e 0 , somewhat more expensive cars at C min + e 2 , etc. This will eventually lead to the following subdivision:
C min + e 0 , Dfl 20,300: cheap cars. C min + e l9 Dfl 20,600: cheap/somewhat more expensive cars. C min + e 2 , Dfl 21,200: somewhat more expensive cars. C min + e 3 , Dfl 22,500: somewhat more/more expensive cars. C min + e 4 , Dfl 25,000: more expensive cars. C min + e 5 , Dfl 30,000: more/much more expensive cars. C min + e 6 , Dfl 40,000: much more expensive cars. We leave it to the reader to décide whether he would in principle agree with the price levels assigned to the respective qualifications. Because we have been concerned with price incréments above the lower bound C min , we can now give a more précise interprétation for the qualifications. A somewhat more expensive car has a price incrément e 2 , which is 4 times the price 270 F. A. LOOTSMA incrément e 0 of a cheap car, etc. We will use this observation to identify the so-called modifiers "somewhat more", "more", and "much more" with ratios 4:1, 16: 1, and 64:1 respectively. They refer to incréments above a certain minimum leveL Via the progression factor and the number of qualifications, these ratios are also related to a certain maximum level. Note that, by this convention, a car of Dfl 25,000 is somewhat more expensive than a car of Dfl 21,2oo because the price incréments also have the ratio 4:1. By the same token, a car of Dfl 21,200 is somewhat cheaper than a car of Dfl 25,000. We ignore the possibility of hystérésis when we invert the orientation of comparative judgement.
It will hopefully be clear now, why we have taken ratios of price incréments to model the intensity of modifiers such as "somewhat more", etc. The ratios of the prices themselves are practically 1:1, at least at the lower end of the range under considération. They do not properly model the strength of the corresponding feelings.
Because the alternative cars are judged under the consumer-price criterion, the target is at the löwer end C min of the interval of possible prices. From this point the décision maker looks at less favourable alternatives. That is the reason why the above categorization, in principle an asymmetrie subdivision of the interval under considération, has been oriented from the lower end: the upward direction is typically the line of sight of the décision maker, at least under the given criterion.
When the cars are judged under the reliability criterion, the orientation is downwards. Numerical data to estimate the reliability are usually available. Consumer organizations collect information about many types and models of cars which follow the prescribed maintenance procedures, and they publish the frequencies of technical failures in the flrst three or five years. Let us suppose that the décision maker only considers cars with a reliability of at least 95%, so that we are restricted to the interval (i? min) R max ) with i? min = 95 and i? max =100. Following the mode of opération just described, we obtain the major echelons represents the relative performance of Aj and A k under the reliability criterion. The qualifications "somewhat cheaper" and "somewhat more reliable" imply that the inverse ratio of the distances to the target (the echelons) is 4:1.
CATEGORY SCALES IN OTHER AREAS
It is surprising to see how consistently human beings categorize certain intervals of interest in totally unrelated areas. They use echelons with geometrie progression because the subséquent intervals are feit to be of the same order of magnitude. Both, the progression factor and the number of catégories or echelons, are so uniform that we confidently use them in multi-criteria analysis to establish a natural relationship between verbal comparative judgement on the one hand and a particular geometrie scale on the other. In this section we present some examples to show, for instance, how human subjects partition certain ranges on the time axis, and how they categorize sound and light intensities.
a. Historical periods
The written history of Europe, from 3,000 BC until today, is subdivided into a small number of major periods. Omitting the recent years which may be the beginning of a new period, and looking backwards from 1985, we distinguish the following turning points marking off the start of a characteristic development:
1947 With these turning points interpolated between the major ones, we fmd a geometrie séquence of echelons, with progression factor 1.8.
b. Planning horizons
Let us now turn towards the future, and let us concern ourselves with industrial planning activities. In this area, we usually observe a hierarchy of planning cycles where décisions under higher degrees of uncertainty and with more important conséquences for the company are increasingly prepared at higher management levels. The planning horizons constitute a geometrie séquence, as the following list readily shows:
1 week: weekly production scheduling. 1 month, 4 weeks: monthly production scheduling, 4 months, 16 weeks: ABC planning of tools and labour.
1 year, 52 weeks: capacity adjustment. 4 years, 200 weeks: production allocation. 10 years, 500 weeks: strategie planning of company structure. The progression factor of these major horizons is 3,5. We do not see any good reason to interpolate planning horizons between the major ones, because they do not seem to occur in practice,
c. Size of nations
The above categorization is not only found on the time axis, but also in spatial dimensions. In order to illustrate this, we categorize the nations on the basis of the size of their population, The major echelons in the list to follow reveal a somewhat European bias. Ömitting the very small nations with less than one million inhabitants, we have: because the respective nations fall typically between the major echelons. The refined séquence of echelons has the progression factor 2.0.
d. Loudness of sounds
Vigorous research in psychophysics has revealed that there is a functional relationship between the intensity of physical stimuli (sound, light,...) on the one hand and the sensory responses (the subjective estimâtes of the intensity) on the other. Psychophysics starts from Weber's law (1834), stating that the just noticeable différence As of stimulus intensities must be proportional to the actual stimulus level s itself. In Fechner's law (1860), the sensory response AT to a just noticeable différence As is supposed to be constant, which implies that AT is proportional to As/s. Intégration yields a logarithmic relationship between T and s. Additional expérience has fïnally shown that Fechner's law does in gênerai not hold. Brentano (1874) suggested that the sensory response AT might be proportional to the response level T, so that AT/T would also be proportional to As/s. By intégration, one obtains that T would be a power function of s. Empirical évidence in many areas of sensory perception prompted Stevens (1957) eventually to postulate the power law as a gênerai psychophysical law. Thus, with s 1 and s 2 representing intensity levels of a particular stimulus such as sound or light, the sensory and the physical intensity ratios are connected by
The exponent P has been established for many sensory Systems under precisely defined circumstances. For a 1,000 Hz tone it is roughly 0.3. It is customary in acoustics to use a <ii?-scale for sound intensities. Thus, the intensity s with respect to a référence intensity s 0 is represented by which implies sjs 2 = 10, In other words, by a step of 10 dB the sound intensity is feit to be doubled. The interesting resuit for our purposes is that the range of audible sounds has roughly been categorized as follows:
dB(s)= 10 \og(s/s 0 ).
40 dB: very quiet; whispering. 60 dB: quiet; conversation. 80 dB: moderately loud; electric mowers and food blenders. 100 dB: very loud; farm tractors and motorcycles. 120 dB: uncomfortably loud; jets during take-off. Although the précision should be taken with a grain of sait because we have a mixture of sound frequencies at each of these major echelons, we obviously find hère a geometrie séquence of subjective sound intensities with the progression factor 4.
e. Brightness of light
Physically, the perception of light and sound proceed in different ways, but these sensory Systems follow the power law with pratically the same value of the exponent p. Hence, a step of 10 dB in light intensity is feit to double the subjective brightness. Under the précaution that the précision should not be taken too seriously because we have at each of these major echelons a mixture of wave lengths, we observe that the subjective light intensities also constitute a geometrie séquence with the progression factor 4.
For a more detailed documentation on psychophysics we refer the reader to Marks (1974) , Michon, Eykman, and de Klerk (1978), Roberts (1979) , Zwicker (1982) , and Stevens and Hallowell Davis (1983) . The reader will find that the sensory Systems for the perception of tastes, smells, and touches follow the power law with exponents in the vicinity of 1. We did not see a categorization such as for loudness and brightness so that we neither have additional évidence nor counter-evidence for the geometrie progression described in the above examples.
A NATURAL SCALE FOR RELATIVE PREFERENCES
In a basic experiment of pairwise-comparison methods for multi-criteria analysis, two stimuli Sj and S k (two alternatives Aj and A k under a particular criterion, two cars under the minimum-price criterion, for instance) are presented to the décision maker whereafter he is requested to express his indifférence between the two, or his weak, strict, strong, or very strong préférence for one of them. We assume that the stimuli have unknown subjective values V-} and V k for him, possibly inversely proportional to the distances from a certain upper limit of attractiveness. The purpose of the basic experiments and the subséquent analysis is to approximate these values under the assumption that they have been normalized. The verbal comparative judgement, given by the décision maker and converted into a numerical value r jk is taken to be an estimate of the ratio Vj/V k . The conversion is based on the results of the preceeding sections, that is, we use a geometrie scale to quantify the verbal statements. Such a scale is conveniently characterized by a scale parameter y, the logarithm of the progression factor (1 +s Obviously, weak (somewhat more) préférence for Sj with respect to S k is converted into exp (2 y) = (1+ e) 2 , strict (more) préférence into exp(4y) = (l + e) 4 , etc. When the progression factor (1+e) is set to 2, we have precisely the ratios for comparative judgement announced at the end of Section 2. It is easy to understand why we set ô Jfc to 1 if the décision maker hésitâtes between indifférence and weak préférence for S p etc. In summary, we use the even values of 8 jk to designate the major echelons (the major gradations) of comparative judgement, and the odd values for the threshold echelons (the threshold gradations).
It is a matter of course that the results of Section 3 prompt us to propose a geometrie scale with (1+e) = 2 and y = 0.7 as a natural scale for the quantification of the gradations just mentioned. We do not see any reason to maintain the fundamental scale of Saaty (1980) . In earlier experiments, we have used a short, normal scale (y = 0.5) and a long scale (y=l), for reasons to be explained at the end of this section. Those scales are still recommended for a sensitivity analysis. Remember that the progression factor of the refined séquences of major and threshold echelons in Section 3 has a progression factor which was roughly equal to 2! We approximate the vector V-(. . ., Vp . . ., V k , . . . ) of subjective stimulus values via logarithmic régression, that is, we approximate V by the normalized vector v which minimizes the expression ,
where the summation is further restricted to the pairs (/, h) judged by the décision maker. He does not really have to consider each pair of stimuli, an advantage which the eigenvector method of Saaty (1980) signally fails to offer. Minimization of (4) is carried out by solving the associated, linear System of normal équations, with variables Wj=\nVj, Obviously, the w j have an additive degree of freedom. The v j will accordingly have a multiplicative degree of freedom, which is used to single out the normalized vector v 9 with components summing up to unity.
By this procedure we calculate stimulus weights for an individual décision maker. We obtain a vector v of group weights, possibly a compromise, by minimizing
j<kde Djk where D jk stands for the set of décision makers who judged the pair (ƒ, &), and r jkd for the estimate of VJV k expressed by décision maker d. We are clearly assuming that the values Vj and V k of the respective alternatives are uniform for the group of décision makers, an assumption that will be further discussed in Section 6, We solve the variables Wj -lnvj from the associated, linear system of normal équations, and we use the multiplicative degree of freedom in the vj to obtain the normalized minimum solution of (5), It is interesting to note that the calculations remain unchanged when each term in (5) is multiplied by the factor p à , the relative power of décision maker d, for instance the relative size of the state or the constituency which he represents (see Lootsma, 1987; Lootsma et al, 1990 ). Then we minimize the expression
by solving a linear system of normal équations. We have the impression that the power game in groups has hitherto been ignored in multi-criteria analysis. This might explain why the décision makers sometimes reject the proposed, formalized approach.
It is interesting to note that the rank order of the calculated stimulus weights does not depend on the scale parameter y. The leading stimulus remains number one. When y tends to zero, the calculated weights tend to be mutually equal. When y goes to infmity, the weight of the leading stimulus increases to l s and the remaining weights converge to 0.
The above procedure is applied m times to calculate the normalized impact scores v t {A^ i= 1, .. .,m, of the alternatives Ap j~l y . . .,n, and only once to calculate the normalized weights w(Ci), z = 1, . . ., w, of the criteria (it will be obvious that the criteria can also be taken to stand for stimuli which are considered in pairs). For the time being, we assume that the scores x^(^) approximate certain subjective values V i (A^ which could be deeply hidden in the mind of the décision makers. Similarly, the w(C f ) approximate unknown subjective criterion values W{C^). Thus, each décision maker carries out at most m[(l/2)n(n-1)] pairwise comparisons to judge the alternatives under the respective criteria, and at most (1/2) m (m-1) comparisons to assess the criteria themselves. As we have seen, not every possible pair has to be presented to each décision maker, but in order to reduce the notorious inconsistency of human judgement, they should consider as many pairs as possible.
In Section 1, we noted that the décision makers fmd it difficult to choose a gradation for their comparative judgement, particularly when the performance of the alternatives under the given criterion is expressed in physical or monetary units. The categorization of Section 2 will help them to carry out the task properly. In many real-life applications we did observe that the décision makers intuitively turn to such a procedure. They classify the alternatives in a small number of groups (the good ones, the bad ones, and an intermediate group) on a vaguely defined range of attractiveness, whereafter they judge them in pairs via inspection of the classification. The alternatives outside the range are practically dropped from further considération.
We conclude this section with a note on our earlier choice of a value for the scale parameter y. In real-life experiments with groups of décision makers (Légrâdy et al., 1984; Lootsma et al, 1986) we used the verbal statements (indifférence, weak, strong, very strong préférence) in two différent ways: (a) we converted them into numerical values on various geometrie scales, with trial values assigned to y, whereafter we applied logarithmic régression [formula (5)] to calculate stimulus weights, and (b) we converted weak, strict, strong, and very strong préférence into préférence without further gradations, whereafter we calculated the stimulus weights via the method of Bradley and Terry (1952) which does not have a particular scale. For practical purposes, the results of (a) and (b) were sufficiently close when y varied between 0.5 and 1. The idea is obvious. Method (a) can be used when we have a single décision maker only who pro vides préférence information in gradations. For method (b), we need a group of 10 or more members, each providing a very limited amount of information in every pairwise comparison: indifférence between the stimuli under considération, or just préférence for one of the two. If we assume that the members are in principle subject to identically distributed perturbations and that they have the same stimulus values in the back of their mind, we may compare the results of (a) and (b) in order to match the scale parameter y. The analysis of the present paper, however, enables us to choose y more precisely. We generate the natural scale by setting y to the value of 0.7. Sensitivity analysis is carried out via the short scale (y = 0.5) and the long scale (y= 1).
AGGREGATION, FINAL SCORES, AND RANK REVERSAL
Aggregation is a delicate opération in multi-criteria analysis. It is a mathematical opération which may present unexpected results to the décision makers, when the underlying assumptions are ignored.
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First, we have to fmd a common nominator for the opération. In what follows ? we shall be assuming that the décision makers express their relative préférence for the alternatives, under each of the respective criteria. Thus, they are not supposed to choose the qualification "somewhat cheaper" when they compare cars under the consumer-price criterion, but "weak préférence" for one of them, etc. Next, we assume that the préférence ratios designated by expressions such as "weak préférence", strict préférence", and "strong préférence", correspond to inverse ratios of echelons in a common range (D min , Z> max ) on the one-dimensional axis of desirability of the alternatives. The orientation of the categorization is downwards from the maximum desirability D max in the actual décision problem. Thus, taking D j =i) max "â nd i\ -Atiax" e k to dénote the desirability of stimuli Sj and S k respectively, we model the préférence for Sj with respect to S k as
In practice, it is difficult to verify whether the intensities of the feelings vary over a common interval under each of the criteria, but it is easy to identify situations where the assumption is violated* In the heated debates about the choice of a strategy for the national electricity supply (Lootsma et ah, 1991) , we found that some participants could reasonably discuss the alternatives under various criteria, but their feelings were intensified to a disproportionate order of magnitude as soon as the safety criterion came under study. The critical issue was nuclear safety! It was obvious that the strength of their feelings feil outside the common range of desirability under the other criteria. The above assumptions enable us, however, to operate with préférence ratios, because they are all defined in terms of distances from the target D max on the common interval (D min1) D mnx ), We consider two alternatives Âj and A k with their calculated profiles, the vectors v t (Aj) 9 Ï-1, . . .,m, and v t {A k )î -l 9 . . ., m, respectively. For each i the ratio ',(#,W
expressing the relative préférence for Aj with respect to A k under criterion C b is unique. Since we are dealing with ratios, it is natural to model the global préférence for Aj with respect to A k by the expression where c i simply dénotes the calculated weight w(C t ) of the z-th criterion. In an attempt to express the global préférences for the respective alternatives by final scores ƒ (Aj) and f(A k ), we set the ratio
to (8), whence
The final scores have a multiplicative degree of freedom. They can accordingly be normalized to sum up to unity. We tacitly hope, of course, that the final scores approximate the subjective global values F (Aj), y=l, ...,«, of the alternatives (provided that they exist).
The geometric-mean aggregation rule (10) has the interesting property of "infinité compensation for zero préférence". Suppose that the décision maker is indifferent between Aj and A k , which implies that the ratio (9) is roughly equal to 1. Imagine now that A j remains fixed but that A k can be varied continuously. If we take one of the impact scores in the profile of A k to converge to 0, then indifférence between Aj and A k can only be maintained if at least one of the remaining scores of A k goes to infinity. It is easy to verify that the arithmetic-mean aggregation rule (2) has "finite compensation for zero préférence" only. Hence, the geometric-mean rule does not make it urgent to introducé a veto mechanism as in ELECTRE, which rules out certain alternatives with an extremely poor performance under one of the criteria.
A peculiar form of rank reversai in the AHP has been observed by Belton and Gear (1983) . They noted that the addition of a new alternative may change the rank order in a set of consistently assessed alternatives. It is easy to verify, however, that the reversai in their example disappears as soon as the arithmetic-mean aggregation rule (2) is replaced by the geometric-mean rule (10) (D. Akkermans, A. Zwagemakers, TU Delft, private communication and M. Sc. thesis) .
It is also important to note that the geometric-mean aggregation rule (8) is based on ratios, which do not depend on the units of measurement! It would be difficult, of course, to measure desirability as such, but in the present method this is not a point of major concern. The ratios are typically dimensionless quantities. Table 1 shows how the weights and the rank order of the criteria as well as the final scores and the rank order of the alternatives, in a projet reported by Lootsma et ai. (1990) , vary with the scale parameter y. The scale variations are considérable, but the sensitivity of the weights and scores remains within reasonable limits. The rank order of the final scores does not change hère. When rank reversai occurs in a real-life project, however, by a sensitivity analysis which shows the weights and scores on the natural scale (y = 0.7) and on two neighbouring scales (y = 0.5 and y =1.0), one has to warn the décision maker that the rank order of the alternatives has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. In doing so, we are close to the results of the French school of thinking in multi-criteria analysis, which is not always able to rank the alternatives completely in a subjective order of préférence. It is important to realize this, because rank reversai is a frequently occurring phenomenon when we vary the numerical scale for comparative judgement. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main thème of this paper is clearly the transition from the objective évaluation to the subjective weighing of the alternatives in a multi-criteria décision problem. The French school models subjective hurnan judgement via partial Systems of binary outranking relations between the alternatives and via a global System of outranking relations. The American school builds partial value functions on the set of alternatives as well as a global value function. Although the American school yields results which are easier to handle in actual décision making, the foundations presented so far are unnecessarily weak. This is what we have shown in the present paper by the introduction of a revised AHP with a natural geometrie scale to quantify comparative human judgement.
Via logarithmic-regression analysis we calculate impact scores and criterion weights to approximate hypothetical, subjective values hidden in the heads of the décision makers. The impact scores approximate the values V t {A^ of the alternatives under the respective criteria ; these values are supposed to be uniform for the group of décision makers. Similarly, the criterion weights approximate the values W(C ( ), uniformly valid for ail décision makers involved in the actual décision problem. If some of these values do not exist, or if they are heavily dependent on the décision makers, we cannot really provide décision support. We cannot guarantee that we help the décision makers to identify their pre-existing subjective values, but we manipulate them towards an (unexpected) compromise solution. In those cases we merely have a mathematical and computational technique which reforms the décision proces. It structures and accélérâtes the délibérations. Décision reform cannot immediately be rejected on moral grounds. We suggest the reader to imagine how a décision should be made when the underlying assumptions (in fact, existence of a consensus) are violated.
Aggregation is based on the strong but reasonable hypothesis, that the desirability of the alternatives varies over a common interval. What we implicitly présuppose, is a group of even-tempered décision makers. Under such an assumption, the final scores approximate the common global préfér-ences deeply hidden in their heads. The hypothesis also reveals the limited scope of multi-criteria analysis. In the words of French (1988) , décision theory is the mathematics of rationality. Irrationality is the driving force behind human décision making, however, and that is not incorporated in the methods for décision support.
The transition from objective évaluation to subjective weighing is not merely a technical question for experts in multi-criteria analysis. On several occasions we found that mathematical and computational tools to support or to reform the subjective weighing are not welcome at all. The RAND Corporation, for instance, a large American consulting company commissioned with the PAWN project (Policy Analysis of Water Management for the Netherlands, see the PAWN reports, 1981 PAWN reports, -1983 by the Dutch water management authority Rijkswaterstaat, designed a large number of alternative stratégies for surface-water control They rejected multi-criteria analysis for the final sélection of a particular strategy, on the ground that the décision makers would have to agree explicitly on the criterion weights and on the impact scores. Although such an agreement is not necessary (the décision makers are completely independent in the exécution of pairwise comparisons, and they only have to agree on the calculated compromise solution), the RAND Corporation still prefers to display the conséquences of the alternative stratégies (expressed in their original physical or monetary units) on coloured cards which would help the décision makers to see the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the stratégies (W. Walker, private communication). The subjective weighing should unconditionally be left to the décision makers themselves, regardless of whether they are able to digest the flood of information without a structured multi-criteria analysis. Incidentally, the example shows that American management consultants do not unanimously follow the American school Conceptually, the RAND Corporation is closer to the French school of thinking which typically concentrâtes on measurable criteria.
We have frequently proposed the structured approach of multi-criteria analysis as a tooi for advisory councils to corne up with a unanimous advice, The General Energy Council in the Netherlands, however, rejected the suggestion (see Lootsma ei ah, 1991) because they did not want to arrive at such a group compromise solution. They agreed that a unanimous advice would be stronger than a set of divided recommendations, but they insisted that the final décision should be taken by the responsible authorities, confronted with the rich variety of views and opinions in the Council. This implies that the subjective weighing is largely left to these authorities, regardless of whether they have the time and the capacity to do so properly.
The fortunes of these projects, however, show that there is an urgent need to improve the subjective weighing in actual décision making. The American school did not go far enough ; in exploring its potential we found that the results are not always far away from what the French school would produce.
